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HOLD MY BEER, HOLD MY PRICE:
STATE POST-AND-HOLD REGULATORY
SCHEMES CONSTITUTE PRICE FIXING
PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAW
Kathrine Maldonado*

ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court has created various tests in cases involving antitrust
preemption of state regulations—such as Midcal’s state immunity two-pronged analysis and Fisher’s hybrid versus unilateral restraint test—without
clarifying how the various tests fit together. This has led to circuit splits not
only in regard to how courts approach antitrust preemption cases but also
in regard to the preemption findings of nearly identical laws in different
circuits. In a departure from the Ninth and Fourth Circuits, the Second
Circuit recently upheld the validity of Connecticut’s post-and-hold alcoholpricing regulation. State post-and-hold regulations effectuate illegal price
fixing between competitors in violation of the Sherman Act, and therefore
should be preempted by federal antitrust law. Under all the tests in Supreme Court antitrust preemption jurisprudence, post-and-hold regulations
fail to escape preemption. Though post-and-hold regulations have been
shown to temper consumption, there are better approaches to protect consumer welfare without also hindering it through anticompetitive means.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Situated at the nexus of constitutional law and antitrust law, state alcohol regulatory schemes often sacrifice generally accepted principles of
competition and free markets for the paternalistic aim of reducing alcohol consumption. Questions of preemption always invoke the difficult
balance of state and federal interests, but preemption of state regulation
of alcohol requires even deeper constitutional consideration because of
the Twenty-first Amendment.1 As this Comment will show, antitrust and
alcohol have had a surprisingly intertwined history over the past century.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.

2021]

Hold My Beer, Hold My Price

843

Complicating the matter is the lack of clarity around antitrust preemption
of state regulatory action.
Part I of this Comment will provide background on the pieces of the
legal puzzle surrounding antitrust preemption of state alcohol regulatory
schemes: § 1 of the Sherman Act, the principles of federalism in regard to
the regulation of alcohol derived from the Twenty-first Amendment, and
the purposes and dangers of post-and-hold provisions. Part II will describe the judicially created state action immunity doctrine and the distinction between hybrid and unilateral restraints.
Part III discusses the current circuit split. The Ninth and Fourth Circuits correctly found that post-and-hold provisions violate § 1 of the Sherman Act because the scheme amounts to per se illegal price fixing, and
that the provisions cannot be saved by the state action immunity doctrine
because they lack the requisite government involvement. The Second Circuit incorrectly found that despite the presence of tacit collusion, the lack
of an explicit agreement or contract between rivals was dispositive of an
antitrust violation. In reality, the interdependent interest created by the
post-and-hold scheme is exactly what obviates the need for an explicit
agreement because the state facilitates the collusion. Lastly, this Part will
emphasize the importance of clarification in this area of the law: currently
one-third of U.S. states have post-and-hold regulatory schemes.2
Part IV argues that post-and-hold laws are always collusive in violation
of § 1 of the Sherman Act, and because they allow private actors—rather
than the state government—to determine the nature and extent of consumer harm, they cannot escape preemption. This Part proposes alternatives to post-and-hold provisions that achieve similar objectives while
avoiding anticompetitive conduct that acts as a counterbalance to the
purported welfare-enhancing goals of post-and-hold provisions.
Finally, the Conclusion iterates the importance of Supreme Court or
congressional clarity in this area and warns that private actors may open
themselves up to risks of liability if they continue to operate in compliance with state schemes that are preempted by federal law.
A. SECTION ONE

OF THE

SHERMAN ACT

Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes “[e]very contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . illegal.”3 This restriction seeks to
prevent the perceived “supreme evil” at the heart of American antitrust
law: collusion among competitors.4 The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890
in reaction to the large amounts of power concentrated in big trusts at the
2. See Wholesale Pricing Practices and Restrictions, ALCOHOL POL’Y INFO. SYS.,
https://alcoholpolicy.niaaa.nih.gov/apis-policy-topics/wholesale-pricing-practices-and-restrictions/3 [https://perma.cc/KFX8-4D2P] (last updated Jan. 1, 2020); see also infra Table 1.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
4. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408
(2004).
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time, and in the words of its eponymous proponent, Senator John Sherman, the Act aimed to preserve “freedom of trade and production, the
natural competition of increasing production, [and] the lowering of prices
by such competition.”5 The language of the Sherman Act is exceptionally
broad, and Congress left the Judicial Branch substantial allowance to determine how to interpret and apply antitrust principles.6 Consequently,
the practical application of antitrust law, somewhat similarly to constitutional law, has ebbed and flowed over the past hundred years with varying judicial outlooks, market conditions, and economic schools of
thought.7 The judiciary has had “the principal responsibility for distinguishing the pernicious from the inoffensive” in its application of § 1.8
Shortly after the passage of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court came
to the conclusion that surely not all agreements in restraint of trade are
forbidden; if that were the case, nearly any business agreement would be
a violation of § 1, making the Act “destructive of all right to contract or
agree [or] combine in any respect.”9 Justice White’s majority opinion in
Standard Oil Co. v. United States10 has been interpreted to mean that
“[a]cts are not forbidden merely because they fall literally within some
statutory prohibition. . . . [but are] forbidden only when they seem likely
to create the evil the legislature sought to avoid.”11 Justice White’s instrumentalism was influential; today, restraints of trade are generally reviewed under either the rule of reason or the per se rule.12
Under the rule of reason, “the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited.”13 Other restraints, such as “horizontal agreements among
competitors to fix prices,” are treated as “necessarily illegal” under the
per se rule.14 The per se rule is used for restraints “that would always or
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output”15 and
have “‘manifestly anticompetitive’ effects.”16 Though the Supreme Court
has been hesitant in recent years to utilize the per se rule, it has said the
rule can be used for the types of restraints that “courts have had considerable experience with” and that the “courts can predict with confidence . . . would be invalidated in all or almost all instances under the
5. 19 CONG. REC. S6041 (daily ed. July 10, 1888) (statement of Senator John
Sherman).
6. C. PAUL ROGERS III & WILLIAM R. ANDERSEN, ANTITRUST LAW: POLICY AND
PRACTICE 12 (Carolina Acad. Press 5th ed. 2020) (1985).
7. See id. at 12–13.
8. Id. at 13.
9. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63 (1911).
10. See generally id.
11. ROGERS & ANDERSEN, supra note 6, at 22.
12. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885–86
(2007).
13. Id. at 885.
14. Id. at 886.
15. Id. (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)).
16. Id. (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977)).
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rule of reason.”17
B. FEDERALISM

AND

ALCOHOL

While principles of antitrust law and federalism frequently collide in
many state regulatory schemes, the constitutional element is even further
heightened in regulatory programs involving the alcohol market in light
of the Twenty-first Amendment of the United States Constitution.18 Notwithstanding other immunities potentially available to protect a state regulation facing preemption by federal law, a provision involving alcohol
has an additional escape route if the court finds that it is a legitimate
exercise of the state’s Twenty-first Amendment powers.19
In a feeble attempt to curtail crime and corruption and address social
issues, Congress passed the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919.20 The now
infamous amendment gave concurrent power to Congress and the states
to enforce the prohibition of “the manufacture, sale, or transportation of
intoxicating liquors.”21 By 1933, liquor stockpiles by the wealthy, a booming black market, and countless speakeasies were proof that the social
experiment had largely failed, leading Congress to repeal the Eighteenth
Amendment through ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment.22 The
Amendment states, “The transportation or importation into any State,
Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited,” which has been interpreted to effectively give the states regulatory
power over alcohol.23 Thus, in situations where a state alcohol regulation
has been found to be in violation of federal antitrust law, states often try
to assert that the Twenty-first Amendment permits the state to “countermand the congressional policy—adopted under the commerce power—in
favor of competition.”24 Despite the “wide latitude” given to state liquor
regulation,25 the Supreme Court has “stressed that important federal interests in liquor matters survived the ratification of the Twenty-first
Amendment,”26 and the Court has “resisted the contention that [the
Amendment] ‘freed the States from all restrictions upon the police power
17. Id. at 886–87.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
19. Lindsey Champlin, Comment, Inebriated and Unbalanced: TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer’s Misguided Reconciliation of the Twenty-first Amendment with the Sherman Act, 17
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1195, 1204 (2010).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; see Karen Powell, Raise a Glass to Constitutional History: Dec. 5 Marks Anniversary of 1933 Repeal of the
18th Amendment, Prohibition, MONT. LAW., Nov. 2014, at 9, 9 (2014).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, §§ 1–2, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
22. Id. amend. XXI, § 1; Powell, supra note 20, at 9, 19.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2; Powell, supra note 20, at 19.
24. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106
(1980).
25. Id. at 108 (quoting Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 42
(1966), abrogated by Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc, 491 U.S. 324 (1989)).
26. Id.
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to be found in other provisions of the Constitution.’”27
Antitrust and alcohol regulation have had a long and strained history.
Both invoke values that sometimes seem in conflict. While there is ample
debate around what should constitute the central goals of antitrust, the
importance of preserving competition in order to reduce prices, minimize
harm to consumers, and promote innovation is widely accepted.28 The
emphasis the United States places on those free-market values can be
witnessed in the language the Supreme Court has used to describe federal
competition policy: “Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in
particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important
to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system
as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal
freedoms.”29
The sale and purchase of alcohol, however, requires considerations that
may not be relevant in other product markets. Generally, states assert the
aim of temperance as a justification for maintaining tight control of the
alcohol market rather than allowing free conditions, as is done for other
products.30 Whether price maintenance actually leads to temperance has
been debated throughout the past few decades,31 but it is generally
agreed that tempered alcohol consumption leads to a healthier and more
cohesive society.32 The Supreme Court, however, seems to have rejected
the sufficiency of that justification and found arguments of temperance
tend to be a pretext for promotion of a local industry: “We have examined whether state alcohol laws that burden interstate commerce serve
a State’s legitimate . . . interests [under § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment]. And protectionism, we have stressed, is not such an interest.”33
Another justification for manipulating alcohol market conditions is the
safeguard of “small licensees from predatory pricing policies of large retailers,”34 despite this protectionist approach being generally rejected as a
priority for antitrust for several decades.35 For example, in 324 Liquor
27. Id. (quoting State Bd. of Equalization v. Young’s Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 64 (1936),
abrogated by Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005)).
28. See ROGERS & ANDERSEN, supra note 6, at 26–27.
29. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 110 (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610
(1972)).
30. See, e.g., id. at 112 (citing Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 579
P.2d 476, 490 (Cal. 1978)).
31. See id. (citing Rice, 579 P.2d at 494).
32. See Frank J. Chaloupka, Michael Grossmand & Henry Saffer, The Effects of Price
on Alcohol Consumption and Alcohol-Related Problems, 26 ALCOHOL RSCH. & HEALTH
22, 28–32 (2002). But see James C. Cooper & Joshua D. Wright, Alcohol, Antitrust, and the
21st Amendment: An Empirical Examination of Post and Hold Laws, 32 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 379, 388–89 (2012) (finding that post-and-hold laws “reduce alcohol consumption
but have no measurable effect on two of the most important social ills associated with
alcohol—drunk driving accidents and teen drinking”).
33. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2469–70 (2019)
(citing Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984)).
34. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 112 (quoting Rice, 579 P.2d at 493).
35. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (“[T]he legislative
history illuminates congressional concern with the protection of competition, not competi-
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Corp. v. Duffy, a case involving review of New York’s liquor pricing system, the Supreme Court held “the State’s unsubstantiated interest in protecting small retailers ‘simply [is] not of the same stature as the goals of
the Sherman Act,’” and therefore the State’s asserted Twenty-first
Amendment interest “d[id] not suffice to afford immunity from the Sherman Act.”36
For many decades, courts have been trying to strike a balance between
states’ rights enumerated in the Twenty-first Amendment and the
supremacy of federal antitrust laws; however, before reaching the question of whether an otherwise preempted state regulatory scheme is protected by the Twenty-first Amendment, courts engage in other judicially
created tests to ascertain whether the regulation should be saved. This
Comment focuses on the tests that come prior to application of the
Twenty-first Amendment in the preemption process, but it is nonetheless
important to understand the role of federalism and other moral considerations that influence the discussion around post-and-hold provisions.
C. POST-AND-HOLD PROVISIONS
After the Twenty-first Amendment ended Prohibition, two primary
methods of state regulation developed: one is the “operation of a state
monopoly on liquor sales with state-run stores,” and the second is “a licensing system that grants licenses to those in the liquor distribution
chain . . . who must operate under detailed regulations.”37 A frequent
restriction imposed by states with a liquor licensing system is the postand-hold pricing system.38 Post-and-hold provisions require “alcohol distributors to both ‘post’ their proposed prices in advance, thus sharing future prices with rival distributors before they go into effect, and then to
‘hold’ these prices for a specified period of time.”39 In many states, for a
short period after the prices are posted, competitors may file amended
prices until the “hold” enforcement goes into effect.40 Currently, onethird of states have post-and-hold regulations.41
tors, and its desire to restrain [market activity] only to the extent that [it] . . . may tend to
lessen competition.” (emphasis added)).
36. 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 338, 350–51 (1987) (first alteration in
original).
37. TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 202 (4th Cir. 2001).
38. See Cooper & Wright, supra note 32, at 380–81 (Over the period from 1983 to
2010, “nineteen states . . . adopted [post-and-hold] laws . . . . [As of 2010,] ten states ha[d]
[post-and-hold] laws applying to wine wholesalers, nine states ha[d] [post-and-hold] laws
applying to beer wholesalers, and nine states ha[d] [post-and-hold] laws applying to spirit
wholesalers.” However, over this period, “seven states . . . repealed their [post-and-hold]
laws, primarily as a result of court decisions.” (footnotes omitted)).
39. Id. at 380.
40. See Schaefer, 242 F.3d at 202 (“Of course, when one wholesaler posts a price
change for an existing product, a competitor may match that price . . . . Under the postand-hold system wholesalers must sell to retailers at the prices established in the posted
schedule for at least the month following the posting.”).
41. See Wholesale Pricing Practices and Restrictions, supra note 2.
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TABLE 1: STATES

WITH

POST-AND-HOLD PROVISIONS42

State

Beverage Type

Connecticut

Beer
Wine
Spirits
Beer
Spirits
Beer
Wine
Beer
Wine
Spirits
Wine
Beer
Beer
Wine
Spirits
Beer
Wine
Wine
Spirits
Beer
Wine
Spirits
Wine
Spirits
Wine
Wine
Spirits
Beer
Beer
Wine
Spirits
Beer
Beer
Beer

Georgia
Idaho
Indiana

Iowa
Maine
Massachusetts

Michigan
Missouri
New Jersey

New York
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
South Dakota

Tennessee
Vermont
West Virginia

[Vol. 74

Minimum Hold
Period (days)
30
30
30
180
14
180
180
7
7
7
30
30
30
30
30
90
90
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
90
60
60
14
10
10
10
360
14
90

42. Id. The table displays policies as of January 1, 2020.

2021]

Hold My Beer, Hold My Price

849

Alcohol retailers often bear the brunt of the anticompetitive effects
caused by post-and-hold provisions; this economic impact is then passed
on to consumers.43 This Comment will argue that the vast majority of
post-and-hold provisions effectuate “horizontal price fixing under a
vague imprimatur in form and agency inaction in fact,” thus effectuating
the ultimate evil of antitrust: price fixing.44 One empirical study found
nearly 75% of product-months featured identical prices among all the
wholesalers, more than 80% of product-months had spreads of less than
2%, and when multiple firms offered the same product, “they nearly always price[d] it almost identically.”45
Often, the party seeking injunction of state post-and-hold provisions
follows a business model that delivers efficiency and profitability despite
small margins due to its large volume of sales.46 A post-and-hold pricing
scheme leads to supracompetitive prices, ultimately causing consumer
harm through a subversion of the free market.47 Because in most cases
wholesalers have the opportunity to match a lower price with no risk of
sparking a price war, there is no incentive for any particular wholesaler to
reduce its price in the first place.48 Pricing uncertainty, particularly in an
oligopolistic market, helps prevent price fixing and other instances of cartel-like behavior.49 If a wholesaler reduces its price, other wholesalers will
just likely meet it, and even if the original wholesaler wanted to undercut
its competitor by setting the lower price, it would “be required to ‘hold
the lower price for an entire month—during which it would have no competitive advantage because its competitors would be charging the same
price.’”50 The resulting pattern is months upon months of identical prices
across wholesalers, and any changes in price are made in lockstep.51
Consistent with states’ other attempts at regulating the distribution of
“intoxicating liquors,”52 states frequently assert goals of temperance and
43. See Schaefer, 242 F.3d at 202–03.
44. FTC. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 639 (1992) (“No antitrust offense is more
pernicious than price fixing.” (citing FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411,
434 & n.16 (1990))).
45. Christopher T. Conlon & Nirupama Rao, The Price of Liquor is Too Damn High:
Alcohol Taxation and Market Structure 21–22 (Univ. of Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus. Kilts Ctr.
for Mktg., Paper No. 2-009, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2610118 [https://perma.cc/BW5S-THAQ].
46. See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 882 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“Costco’s warehouse businesses are ‘based on the concept that offering [its] members very
low prices on a limited selection of nationally branded and selected private-label products . . . will produce high sales volumes and rapid inventory turnover.’ Costco’s business
model also relies upon ‘operating efficiencies achieved by volume purchasing, efficient distribution and reduced handling of merchandise . . . .’” (original) (citation omitted)).
47. Conn. Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC v. Seagull, 932 F.3d 22, 27–28 (2d Cir. 2019).
48. Id. at 27.
49. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 238
(1993) (“Uncertainty is an oligopoly’s greatest enemy.”).
50. Conn. Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC, 932 F.3d at 27 (citing Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 9, Conn. Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC, 932 F.3d 22 (No. 17-2003-cv)).
51. Id. at 27–28.
52. Battipaglia v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 180 (2d Cir. 1984) (Winter, J.,
dissenting).
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health as a justification for artificially raising market prices. Judge Winter
of the Second Circuit strongly critiqued such claims:
Although the statute expresses a concern over the perils of cheap
(competitively priced) liquor, the notion that this [type of] legislation
was even remotely the result of political pressure exerted by aroused
temperance groups is a quaint fiction. The self-evident purpose of
the statute is to create a cartel of liquor wholesalers for their
benefit.53
States must develop more effective approaches to discourage the consumption of alcohol, if that is to be the goal.
Talk of temperance appears to be a pretext; the “self-evident purpose is
not to protect the public from the evils of the demon rum, but to preserve
the high standard of living of those who sell it.”54 The effect of the provision is to encourage wholesalers to post inflated prices for alcohol, safe in
the knowledge that they will have the opportunity to match any price cuts
of a competitor, though the possibility of a price cut is itself highly unlikely.55 The anticompetitive effects extend beyond just the existing market: “[A] market entrant hoping to gain market share by lowering prices
will inevitably be frustrated by the adjust-and-hold provisions of the statute, which will prevent the entrant from further reducing prices.”56 The
result is a “de facto cartel” free to maintain supracompetitive prices
“without fear of market reprisal.”57
II. THE STATE IMMUNITY DOCTRINE AND THE ROLE OF
UNILATERAL AND HYBRID RESTRAINTS
A. PREEMPTION

AND THE

STATE ACTION IMMUNITY DOCTRINE

Despite the federal policy to promote competition and free-market activity, antitrust laws may be superseded by state regulatory programs
where there is “[a]ctual state involvement, not deference to private
pricefixing arrangements under the general auspices of state law.”58 “Immunity is conferred [to the state regulation] out of respect for ongoing
regulation by the State, not out of respect for the economics of price restraint.”59 As in all preemption cases, to determine whether the Sherman
Act preempts a state statute, “the inquiry is whether there exists an irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state regulatory schemes.”60
Because a “hypothetical or potential conflict is insufficient” for preemption, a state statute is preempted only if “on its face [it] irreconcilably
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Conn. Fine Wine & Spirits v. Seagull, 936 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2019) (Sullivan, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 633 (1992).
59. Id.
60. Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982).
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conflicts with federal antitrust policy.”61 In the antitrust context, that has
come to mean that a state statute is preempted “only if it mandates or
authorizes conduct that necessarily constitutes a violation of the antitrust
laws in all cases, or if it places irresistible pressure on a private party to
violate the antitrust laws in order to comply with the statute.”62 In other
words, the conduct effectuated by the statute must be a per se violation
for preemption to apply.63 Once a statute has been determined to violate
federal antitrust laws per se, it may have the potential to escape preemption through doctrines based on the preservation of constitutional state
rights.
In one early case involving state regulation of alcohol, the Supreme
Court held “when a state compels retailers to follow a parallel price policy, it demands private conduct which the Sherman Act forbids.”64 The
Court found that the minimum resale agreements authorized by Louisiana fair trade law were preempted by the Sherman Act because “when
retailers are forced to abandon price competition, they are driven into a
compact in violation of the . . . proviso which forbids ‘horizontal’ price
fixing” and are therefore in per se violation of the Act.65 Importantly,
anticompetitive state “[l]egislation that would otherwise be preempted . . . may nonetheless survive if it is found to be state action immune from antitrust scrutiny.”66
Though the doctrine was arguably foreshadowed in earlier cases, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Parker v. Brown is considered to be the origin of what is known today as the state action immunity doctrine.67 In
Parker, the Court acknowledged that a California program regulating the
price for raisins that effectively eliminated price competition in the market “would violate the Sherman Act if it were organized” and operated
by “private persons, individual or corporate.”68 The Court found that the
state-run program was not preempted by the Sherman Act, however, because “[i]t derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state,” and “nothing in the language of the Sherman Act . . .
suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents
from activities directed by its legislature.”69 The Court noted that a state
cannot simply bestow immunity on Sherman Act violators by “authorizing” their behavior or “by declaring that their action is lawful.”70 Rather,
to fall within the state action immunity doctrine, the state must “itself
exercise[ ] its legislative authority in making the regulation” as sovereign;
the state’s close involvement in the anticompetitive regulation is thus a
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. at 661.
See id.
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 389 (1951).
Id. at 385–86, 389 (emphasis added).
Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 265 (1986).
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943).
Id. at 347–350.
Id. at 350–51 (emphasis added).
Id. at 351.
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requirement for immunity.71
The interaction between, and overlap of, preemption principles and the
state action immunity doctrine has been blurry at best; however, in Fisher
v. City of Berkeley, the Supreme Court provided some clarification:
“[C]onsideration of state action is not necessary unless an actual conflict
with the antitrust laws is established.”72 Even despite this clarification,
since Parker, courts have struggled in their effort to apply the state action
immunity doctrine and strike a balance between the goals of federal antitrust laws and the rights of states as sovereigns, leading to inconsistent
results.73 In light of the inconsistencies in subsequent opinions, in 1980
the Supreme Court adopted a two-pronged test for antitrust immunity for
state regulatory programs.74
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., a
wine distributor successfully challenged California’s price-posting statutes
as an illegal restraint of trade under the Sherman Act.75 The state regulation required wholesalers to post wine prices and then banned licensees
from selling below the posted price.76 The Court found that the regulation in Midcal amounted to resale price maintenance and violated the
Sherman Act, so the question then became whether the regulation could
escape preemption through immunity.77 After reviewing state action immunity cases that took place post-Parker, the Midcal Court synthesized
the holdings into a two-step test: “First, the challenged restraint must be
‘one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy’; second, the policy must be ‘actively supervised’ by the State itself.”78 Although the state program was found to pass the first step, it did not meet
the second requirement because “[t]he State neither establishes prices
nor reviews the reasonableness of the price schedules” and “does not
monitor market conditions or engage in any ‘pointed reexamination’ of
71. Id. at 352 (noting that the Commission was required to approve the program; “enforce[ ] it with penal sanctions, in the execution of a governmental policy”; “prescrib[e] the
conditions of [the regulation’s] application”; and vote on referendum for the application of
the regulations).
72. Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 264 (1986).
73. Christopher J. Heck, Concerted Action and the Preemption of State Fair Trade Provisions After Leegin, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 853, 854.
74. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980).
75. Id. at 99–102.
76. Id. at 99.
77. Id. at 102–03. It is worth noting that at the time Midcal was decided, resale price
maintenance was considered a per se violation of the Sherman Act. See id. at 102. In a 2007
decision, the Supreme Court narrowed the per se rule by finding that, although resale price
maintenance presents economic dangers, the conduct should be subject to the rule of reason. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007)
(“[V]ertical price restraints are to be judged by the rule of reason.”). Importantly, although
the resale price maintenance at issue may have been a vertical price restraint, the Court
suggested its effect could still amount to horizontal price fixing, which is still per se illegal
today. See id. at 886, 892–93, 907–08.
78. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435
U.S. 389, 410 (1978)).
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the program.”79
The Supreme Court explained that the importance of the second requirement “stems from the recognition that where a private party is engaging in . . . anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that he is
acting to further his own interests . . . . [T]he active supervision requirement mandates that the State exercise ultimate control over the challenged anticompetitive conduct.”80 In such situations where the state
lacks ultimate control, “[t]he national policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement over
what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.”81 The state may be
permitted to exercise regulatory control, “but only by taking ultimate responsibility for the choices” made as part of its interference in the free
market.82
B.

FISHER V. CITY

OF

BERKELEY’S IMPACT
PREEMPTION

ON

ANTITRUST

For conduct to violate § 1 of the Sherman Act,83 it must involve more
than one actor.84 Even if one actor’s conduct directly impacts prices in a
way similar to concerted action, “there can be no liability under § 1 in the
absence of agreement.”85 In Fisher v. City of Berkeley, the Supreme
Court emphasized the importance of distinguishing between unilateral
and concerted action.86 Although the municipal rent-control scheme in
Fisher had the effect of nearly eliminating any price competition, the
Court did not find it to be in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act (and
therefore subject to preemption) because it found that the government
unilaterally imposed the restraint.87 The Court held that because there
was no “meeting of the minds” between the landlords subject to the rentcontrol program, § 1’s contract, conspiracy, or combination requirement
was not met: “A restraint imposed unilaterally by government does not
become concerted-action . . . simply because it has a coercive effect upon
parties who must obey the law. . . . [It] is not enough to establish a con79. Id. at 105–06.
80. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 634 (1992) (emphasis added) (quoting
Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100–01 (1988)).
81. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 106.
82. William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, Parker v. Brown, the Eleventh Amendment,
and Anticompetitive State Regulation, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1465, 1479 (2019).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (making illegal “any contract” or “combination or conspiracy” in
“restraint of trade or commerce”).
84. Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 266 (1986) (“[T]his Court has always limited the reach of [§ 1] to ‘unreasonable restraints of trade effected by a “contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy” between separate entities,’” (quoting Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)), and it is “therefore . . . ‘of considerable importance’ that independent activity by a single entity be distinguished from a concerted effort by more than one entity to fix prices or otherwise restrain trade.” (quoting
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763 (1984))).
85. Id. at 266. (first citing Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 760–61; and then citing United States
v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 265–67, 270.
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spiracy.”88 By contrast, a hybrid restraint—one in which “nonmarket
mechanisms . . . enforce private marketing decisions,” such as the liquor
pricing scheme in Midcal—is subject to antitrust scrutiny.89 Where there
is “a degree of private regulatory power” granted to private actors,90 “the
mere existence of legal compulsion [will] not turn [the State’s] scheme
into unilateral action by the State.”91
The Fisher Court differentiated the regulatory scheme imposed by the
City of Berkeley from the Midcal regulation because it “place[d] complete control . . . exclusively in the hands of the [governmental agency]”;
“Not just the controls themselves but also the [price] ceilings they mandate have been unilaterally imposed on the [competitors] by the city.”92
The Court acknowledged that “[t]here may be cases in which what appears to be a . . . [government]-administered price[-]stabilization scheme
is really a private price-fixing conspiracy,”93 which “might occur even
where prices are ostensibly under the absolute control of government officials.”94 The Court did not provide guidance as to how the hybrid versus
unilateral restraint distinction should apply in such a situation.
What most courts have taken away from the Fisher decision is that if a
restraint is unilateral, it escapes preemption by § 1 of the Sherman Act;
only hybrid restraints will lead to an assessment of whether the state action immunity doctrine can save it from preemption.95 Further, state action immunity “applies to the hybrid restraint only if it satisfies the twopart Midcal inquiry.”96 The Fisher Court, however, did not provide substantial guidance on how to classify a restraint as hybrid or unilateral,
leaving lower courts the responsibility of attempting to ascertain the “extraordinarily elusive” line between the two.97
III. POST-AND-HOLD PROVISIONS INDUCE PRICE FIXING
AMONGST COMPETITORS AND LACK SUFFICIENT
GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT TO ESCAPE
PREEMPTION
The Second Circuit recently diverged from its sibling circuits in finding
that Connecticut’s post-and-hold provisions did not constitute a violation
88. Id. at 267, 277.
89. Id. at 267–69, 277 n.2.
90. Id. at 268 (quoting Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654 , 666 n.1 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
91. Id. at 269.
92. Id.
93. Id. (citing Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
106 (1980)).
94. Id.
95. See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, State Action and the Meaning of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: An Approach to Hybrid Restraints, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 269,
271–72 (2003).
96. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 887 (9th Cir. 2008).
97. Lopatka & Page, supra note 95, at 272; see also ROGERS & ANDERSEN, supra note
6, at 875 ( “The issue of ‘hybrid restraints’ has been exhaustively litigated in a series of
cases” (citing Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Cuomo, 624 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2010))).
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of § 1 of the Sherman Act.98 The plaintiff, Total Wine, argued that the
regulatory scheme eliminated price competition among wholesalers,
which effectively led to price fixing, and the result was that retailers could
not compete on the basis of cost because the wholesalers essentially controlled both the retail price and the retailers’ profit margins.99 In regard
to the post-and-hold provisions, the Second Circuit’s analysis focused on
the Fisher inquiry: whether the provisions were unilateral in nature or
whether they permitted a degree of freedom to wholesalers, allowing
them to reach an agreement as to pricing, in which case the provisions
would be considered hybrid.100
The Second Circuit constrained itself to its precedent in Battipaglia v.
New York State Liquor Authority, which held that similar provisions
under New York law were not preempted by the Sherman Act.101 In so
holding, the court prioritized the method in which anticompetitive collusion was formed; relying on Battipaglia, the court found that the postand-hold provision “‘d[id] not compel . . . agreement’ among wholesalers,” but only “individual act[ion].”102 Despite acknowledging that the
provision “invites and facilitates conscious parallelism in pricing,” which
amounts to price fixing,103 the court found that the posted and held prices
were ultimately “individual acts,”104 and thus the conduct lacked the
“meeting of the minds” required for a § 1 violation.105 The court stated
that “conscious parallel acts based on competitors’ mutual recognition of
‘shared economic interests’ are not ‘in [themselves] unlawful.’”106
Though it is true conscious parallelism alone does not necessarily constitute a conspiracy, other factors indicating a lack of independent action
are present: “high market concentration[ ] and lack of product differentiation.”107 Therefore, as the Fourth and Ninth Circuits held (without needing to reach the question of whether the private actors’ conscious
parallelism was coupled with plus factors),108 the requisite collusion was
present.
The Second Circuit’s deviation from the stance taken by the Fourth and
Ninth Circuits is due to its misplaced focus on the presence—or alleged
lack thereof—of private agreements rather than the correct emphasis on
98. Conn. Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC v. Seagull, 932 F.3d 22, 39 (2d Cir. 2019). Following the decision, a judge requested to rehear the case en banc, but a majority was not
reached and the hearing was denied. Conn. Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC v. Seagull, 936 F.3d
119 (2d Cir. 2019).
99. Conn. Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC, 932 F.3d at 27–28.
100. See id. at 30–32; Fisher v. City of Berkley, 475 U.S. 260, 267–68 (1986).
101. Id. at 34, 36 (citing Battipaglia v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 170 (2d
Cir. 1984)).
102. Id. at 34, 39 (quoting Battipaglia, 745 F.2d at 170).
103. Id. at 39.
104. Id. at 34, 39 (quoting Battipaglia, 745 F.2d at 170).
105. Id. at 31, 39 (quoting Fisher, 475 U.S. at 267).
106. Id. at 38 (alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 553–54 (2007)).
107. See Heck, supra note 73, at 884.
108. See TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 208–09 (4th Cir. 2001); Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 894–96 (9th Cir. 2008).
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the degree of government oversight and involvement when addressing
anticompetitive state pricing laws. The Fourth Circuit explained that
“post-and-hold system[s] [are] classic hybrid restraint[s]” because “the
State requires wholesalers to set prices and stick to them, but it does not
review those privately set prices for reasonableness; the wholesalers are
thus granted a significant degree of private regulatory power.”109 Echoing
this analysis, the Ninth Circuit found that post-and-hold provisions could
not be considered unilateral because (1) “a showing of concerted activity
among the [state] wholesalers is not necessary to establish an antitrust
violation,” and (2) the state “allows private parties to set the prices and
does not review the reasonableness of those prices.”110 The Ninth Circuit
explicitly rejected the reasoning in Battipaglia—the case by which the
Second Circuit claimed to be bound—due to the lack of governmental
monitoring or oversight.111
Section 1 preemption of a state post-and-hold provision should turn on
the degree of government involvement and private regulatory power
granted to competitors rather than the presence of conscious agreement
among competitors because the harmful effects of tacit collusion are present regardless of a “meeting of the minds,”112 and therefore, the conduct
falls squarely within the spirit of what antitrust law seeks to prevent.
A. THE NINTH AND FOURTH CIRCUITS APPLIED THE MIDCAL TEST
AND FISHER ANALYSIS DIFFERENTLY BUT REACHED THE
SAME CORRECT CONCLUSION
In Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, Costco alleged that Washington
state’s Liquor Control Board (LCB) imposed beer and wine regulations
that “restrict[ed] many of [Costco’s] efficient and competitive practices . . . and create[d] or facilitate[d] agreement among distributors and
among [manufacturers] . . . in restraint of competition.”113 The complaint
challenged nine different state restraints on the sale and distribution of
beer and wine, two of which were “price posting” and “hold” requirements that forced beer and wine distributors to publicly post their wholesale prices for all brands of beers or wine sold and hold those posted
prices for at least thirty days.114 The LCB argued that the provisions it
109. Schaefer, 242 F.3d at 208–09.
110. Miller v. Hedlund, 813 F.2d 1344, 1350–51 (9th Cir. 1987).
111. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 893–95 (9th Cir. 2008).
112. Contra Conn. Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC v. Seagull, 932 F.3d 22, 31, 38 (2d Cir.
2019) (quoting Fisher v. City of Berkley, 475 U.S. 260, 267 (1986)).
113. Maleng, 522 F.3d at 882 (second alteration in original).
114. Id. at 883. Other restraints included: (1) a “uniform pricing rule” under which distributors “must sell a particular product at the same price to every distributor”; (2) a “minimum mark-up provision” which required distributors “to price . . . products at no less than
10% above their acquisition costs”; (3) a ban on volume discounts; (4) a ban on selling beer
and wine on credit; (5) a “delivered price” requirement which requires distributors to sell
products at the same “‘delivered’ price to all retailers, even if the retailer pays the freight
and picks up the goods itself”; (6) a “central warehousing ban” which “prohibits retailers
from storing or taking delivery of beer and wine at a central warehouse;” (7) and a “prohibition on retailers selling beer and wine to other retailers.” Id. at 883–84. All restraints
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imposed were unilateral restraints of trade and therefore were not preempted by the Sherman Act.115
Before proceeding to answer the question of whether Washington’s
beer and wine regulatory scheme facially violated the Sherman Act, the
court acknowledged the methodological problem posed “because of the
uncertain relationship between the ‘active supervision’ inquiry under
[Midcal] and the ‘hybrid/unilateral’ inquiry under [Fisher].”116 The Ninth
Circuit contended that the “substantial overlap between [Midcal’s] active
supervision and [Fisher’s] hybrid inquiries” is so strong that “they effectively merge.”117 The court asserted that the bottom-line rule emerging
from the Supreme Court’s string of cases involving preemption is that
“state statutes . . . creating unsupervised private power in derogation of
competition are subject to preemption.”118 Quoting a case from the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit remarked, “Where the anti-competitive effects of a state statute obviate the need for private parties to act on their
own to create an anti-competitive scheme, the statute may be attacked as
a ‘hybrid’ restraint on trade.”119 However, the court noted that anticompetitive effects are not solely determinative because the “forbidden” aspect is the state regulatory programs that “facilitate arrangements
between private parties that suppress competition.”120
Despite observing that “the line between a hybrid and unilateral restraint ‘is extraordinarily elusive,’” the Ninth Circuit easily found that
Washington’s post-and-hold provision was a hybrid restraint subject to
preemption by the Sherman Act.121 The court rejected the LCB’s assertion that the “combination” or “conspiracy” requirement for a violation
of § 1 of the Sherman Act was lacking and therefore dispositive: “While it
is true that there is no agreement or concerted activity . . . it can not [sic]
be ignored that the challenged regulations facilitate the exchange of price
information and require adherence to the publicly posted prices,” and
therefore, “through non-market mechanisms, [the state] . . . enforced or
apart from the post-and-hold provision were found to be unilateral and therefore not subject to preemption by the Sherman Act. Id. at 901.
115. Id. at 884.
116. Id. at 886–87 (citations omitted) (first citing Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980); and then citing Fisher v. City of Berkley,
475 U.S. 260 (1986)) (“[T]he Supreme Court has not provided clear guidance in defining
the relationship between the ‘hybrid’ restraint inquiry and the Midcal ‘active supervision’
inquiry.” (citing Snake River Valley Elec. Ass’n v. PacifiCorp, 238 F.3d 1189, 1192 n.8 (9th
Cir. 2001))).
117. Id. at 887–88 (“[W]e believe that a determination of whether a restraint is hybrid
will largely answer the question of whether the state actively supervises the restraint.”).
118. Id. at 889 (citing Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 223 (2d Cir.
2004)).
119. Id. (quoting Freedom Holdings, 357 F.3d at 223).
120. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Mass. Food Ass’n v. Mass. Alcoholic Beverages
Control Comm’n, 197 F.3d 560, 566 (1st Cir. 1999)).
121. Id. at 888, 894 (quoting Lopatka & Page, supra note 95, at 272). The court found
“[s]tate enforcement of adherence to privately set, supra-competitive prices is precisely the
danger which the Supreme Court envisioned in crafting the hybrid and active supervision
tests.” Id. at 896. In short, “[the court] ha[d] little trouble concluding that the post-andhold scheme would constitute a per se violation of the Sherman Act.” Id.
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facilitated privately-made pricing decisions.”122
The court distinguished the hybrid post-and-hold restraint from a unilateral restraint in which, although there still may be an anticompetitive
effect, “public officials determine[ ] the nature and extent of the resulting
consumer injury, with no degree of discretion delegated to private actors.”123 The anticompetitive effect of a unilateral restraint is not
achieved through private action but “is simply part-and-parcel of the
state-imposed” trade restraint; such restraints lack the “‘concerted action’ requirement of Fisher.”124 By contrast, the post-and-hold scheme
“facilitates and encourages interdependent prices, which . . . are set solely
according to private marketing decisions of non-state actors.”125 Such
prices, set by private actors rather than by the state, create an anticompetitive outcome because they are “highly likely to facilitate horizontal collusion among market participants.”126
In oligopolistic markets, “the dissemination of information about prices
and a credible commitment to maintain those prices reduce a firm’s uncertainty about its rivals’ pricing behavior and thereby predictably foster
a non-competitive outcome.”127 After finding the post-and-hold pricing
scheme was a hybrid restraint that per se violated § 1 of the Sherman Act,
the court considered the state action immunity doctrine only in a footnote, saying “we view the Midcal active supervision prong in this case as
largely collapsing into Fisher’s hybrid/unilateral inquiry.”128 Even so, the
court emphasized that “viewing the post-and-hold scheme through the
active supervision prism [did] not help Washington” because the State did
not determine the prices, did not review the prices for reasonableness,
and did not reexamine the program.129 After dismissing any chance of the
state’s regulatory scheme receiving state action immunity, the Ninth Circuit also found the State failed to carry its burden for the Twenty-first
Amendment defense, and therefore the provision was preempted by the
Sherman Act.130
The Fourth Circuit addressed a similar post-and-hold provision, this
time enforced by the state of Maryland, in TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer.131 The
122. Id. at 893 (second alteration in original) (quoting Miller v. Hedlund, 813 F.2d 1344,
1349 (9th Cir. 1987)).
123. Id. at 890 (quoting Lopatka & Page, supra note 95, at 272) (Although “[t]he ban
removes from the market certain firms or persons who might otherwise compete” and
“prices for the consumer may be higher than they would otherwise be in the absence of the
ban[,] . . . the potential anti-competitive effect is not the result of private pricing or marketing decisions, but the logical and intended result of the statute itself.”).
124. Id. at 890.
125. Id. at 895 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 896.
127. Lopatka & Page, supra note 95, at 311.
128. Maleng, 552 F.3d at 901 & n.22.
129. Id. at 901 n.22.
130. Id. at 895–96, 904 (“The Supreme Court has held that an agreement to adhere to
posted prices is a per se violation without regard to its reasonableness.” (citing Catalano,
Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 649–50 (1980) (per curiam))).
131. TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 201–02 (4th Cir. 2001).
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court observed a “[c]ommon thread[ ]” running through three Supreme
Court decisions that found state liquor or wine and beer laws were hybrid
restraints involving concerted action: each “empowered private parties to
set prices, and those prices were enforced by government mechanisms.”132 After finding that Maryland’s post-and-hold pricing scheme irreconcilably conflicted with the Sherman Act, the court held that
Maryland could not claim state action immunity.133
Maryland’s involvement in the regulatory scheme included the authority to “revoke or suspend a wholesaler’s license for a violation” of the
post-and-hold restriction, or other relevant provisions.134 The comptroller
also published notices of violations and resulting sanctions, and distributed the information to all liquor wholesalers.135 Despite those actions of
the comptroller enforcing the regulatory scheme, the court did not find its
involvement sufficient to meet the second prong of the Midcal analysis
because, similar to New York in 324 Liquor, Maryland did not set liquor
prices, did not review prices for reasonableness, and “did not monitor
[liquor market] conditions” or “engage in any ‘pointed reexamination’ of
[Maryland’s liquor pricing] program.”136
Maryland appealed the finding that its post-and-hold regulatory
scheme was a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act in TFWS, Inc. v.
Franchot; the resulting opinion was issued ten years following the initial
complaint seeking injunctive relief.137 The court found that the postedand-held prices were hybrid restraints and per se violations of § 1 of the
Sherman Act because they “mandated activity that was ‘essentially a
form of horizontal price fixing.’”138 Maryland unsuccessfully relied on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc.139 to argue that “resale price maintenance is no longer subject
to [per se] analysis under federal antitrust law, but instead must be judged
under a rule-of-reason standard,” and thus, its post-and-hold provision
did not facially violate § 1 of the Sherman Act.140 The court rejected Maryland’s assertion because the post-and-hold scheme was “a form of horizontal price fixing,” whereas Leegin “concerned vertical resale price
maintenance.”141 In fact, the Fourth Circuit explained that the decision in
132. Id. at 208 (first citing Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384
(1951); then citing Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980); and then citing 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987)). The Fourth Circuit
also noted that “[t]he Supreme Court found that the hybrid restraint in each case was a per
se violation of § 1.” Id.
133. Id. at 210.
134. Id. at 203.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 210–11 (quoting 324 Liquor Corp., 479 U.S. at 344–45).
137. TFWS, Inc. v. Franchot, 572 F.3d 186, 188 (4th Cir. 2009) (beginning the opinion
with the observation that “[t]his long-running antitrust suit is on appeal for the fourth
time”).
138. Id. at 190 (quoting Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 209 (4th Cir. 2001)).
139. 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
140. Id. at 191–92 (quoting Brief of Appellants at 28, Franchot, 572 F.3d 186 (No. 072108)).
141. Id. (first citing Schaefer, 242 F.3d at 209; and then citing Leegin, 551 U.S. at 904).
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Leegin actually reinforced Supreme Court precedent applying the per se
rule to horizontal price fixing: there is a “plain distinction between the
lawful right to publish prices . . . on the one hand,” such as in vertical
resale-price maintenance, “and an agreement among competitors limiting
action with respect to the published prices, on the other,” such as in postand-hold schemes.142
Although the Ninth Circuit “collapse[d]”143 the Midcal “active supervision” assessment into its unilateral versus hybrid Fisher analysis144 while
the Fourth Circuit appeared to distinctly address the characteristics,145
both courts came to the same conclusion: post-and-hold provisions are
hybrid restraints that violate § 1 of the Sherman Act and cannot be saved
by state action immunity because the requisite government involvement
is lacking.146 Several district courts have reached the same opinion.147
B. THE SECOND CIRCUIT MISSED ITS OPPORTUNITY
BATTIPAGLIA

TO

CORRECT

Connecticut’s post-and-hold provision requires wholesalers to post a
monthly “bottle price” and “case price” with the state’s Department of
Consumer Protection (DCP) for each product that will be sold during
that month.148 Posted prices are disseminated throughout the industry,
and in the following four days, wholesalers may amend their prices to
match competitors’ lower prices for a particular product.149 The lower
prices, however, must not be lower than the price being met.150 Wholesalers must hold their prices at the posted price for the following month.151
Total Wine, “the largest retailer of wine and spirits in the United States,”
brought suit against the Commissioner of the DCP, seeking injunctive
and declaratory relief, similar to that granted in the Ninth and Fourth
Circuit decisions preempting state regulatory post-and-hold pricing provisions.152 Total Wine alleged that the post-and-hold scheme, in conjunction with two other liquor regulations, had resulted in “retail prices for
wine and spirits in Connecticut that [were] as much as 24% higher than
prices offered for identical products in the surrounding states.”153
142. Id. at 192 (alteration in original) (quoting Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446
U.S. 643, 649–50 (1980) (per curiam)).
143. Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486, 507 (1986).
144. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 887 (9th Cir. 2008)
145. Schaefer, 242 F.3d at 207, 210.
146. Maleng, 522 F.3d at 887–88, 904; Schaefer, 242 F.3d at 210–11.
147. See Beer & Pop Warehouse v. Jones, 41 F. Supp. 2d 552, 561–62 (M.D. Pa. 1999);
Canterbury Liquors & Pantry v. Sullivan, 16 F. Supp. 2d 41, 45–46 (D. Mass. 1998).
148. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-63(a), (d) (West 2021); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 306-B12(a) (2021).
149. § 30-63(c); § 30-6-B12(g).
150. § 30-63(c); see also § 30-6-B12.
151. § 30-63(c); § 30-6-B12(b), (d).
152. Conn. Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC v. Seagull, 932 F.3d 22, 27 (2d Cir. 2019).
153. Id. at 28 (citing Complaint ¶ 18, Seagull, 932 F.3d 22 (No. 17-2003-cv)).
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At the beginning of its preemption analysis, the Second Circuit placed
emphasis on the requirement that a state statute “must bring about conduct that would require [per se] condemnation under § 1” in order to face
preemption.154 The court stated it read Supreme Court precedent to constitute a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the conduct compelled by the state
is unilateral or hybrid and whether it per se violates the Sherman Act,
and (2) whether the state action immunity doctrine applies.155 This approach is more similar to that taken by the Fourth Circuit, rather than the
“collapsed” approach taken by the Ninth Circuit. In working through the
first step, the court had to decide whether it would follow its prior decision in Battipaglia v. New York State Liquor Authority, which was decided by a divided panel prior to Fisher and upheld liquor price
constraints similar to Connecticut’s post-and-hold provision.156
In Battipaglia, Judge Friendly, who remarked that he was “present at
the creation” of the Twenty-first Amendment, opened the opinion by
identifying “an aura of unreality” in any expectation that the constitutionality of state liquor laws should be examined in a similar fashion as
other state regulatory statutes.157 Judge Friendly, however, acknowledged
that the Supreme Court had made “clear that the [Twenty-first] Amendment did not entirely remove state regulation of alcoholic beverages from
the ambit of the Commerce Clause.”158 The court held that because § 1 of
the Sherman Act bans restraints of trade formed through “contract[s],
combination[s,] . . . or conspiracies,” the liquor sale regulations could not
induce a per se antitrust violation.159
The Second Circuit distinguished Midcal as “involving an implicit
agreement for resale price maintenance,”160 whereas the New York price
provision did not “suffer[ ] from the same infirmity”161 because “[§] 1
requires an agreement, state compulsion of individual action is the very
antithesis of an agreement, and the argument that an agreement could
have been inferred if the wholesalers had voluntarily done what they
have been compelled to do is simply too ‘iffy.’”162 Judge Friendly did,
154. Id. at 30 (“A party may successfully enjoin the enforcement of a state statute only
if the statute on its face irreconcilably conflicts with federal antitrust policy.” (citing Rice v.
Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982)).
155. Id. at 31–32, 32 n.11 (citing Freedom Holdings Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 223 (2d
Cir. 2004)).
156. Id. at 33–34, 36 (citing Battipaglia v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 168,
179–80 (2d Cir. 1984)).
157. Battipaglia, 745 F.2d at 168–69 (discussing the role the Twenty-first Amendment
played in ending the federal government’s “noble experiment” to control the drinking habits of all citizens, and the grant of “full authority” to the states to deal with “intoxicating
liquor free from limitations imposed by the Commerce Clause”).
158. Id. at 169–70 (quoting Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 275 (1984)).
159. Id. at 170 (alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1) (“[S]chedules required to
be filed by the wholesalers are their individual acts.”).
160. Id. at 172 (citing U.S. Brewers Ass’n, Inc. v. Healy, 532 F. Supp. 1312, 1329–30 (D.
Conn.), rev’d on other grounds, 692 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1982), aff’d, 464 U.S. 909 (1983)).
161. See id. at 172–75 (quoting Lewis-Westco & Co. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 186 Cal. Rptr. 552, 557 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)).
162. Id. at 173.
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however, acknowledge a counterargument: “[A] statute compelling conduct which, in its absence, would permit the inference of an agreement
unlawful under § 1 is inconsistent with that section.”163
Ignoring the economic realities compelled by the state liquor regulatory scheme, the court held that the state statute did not violate the Sherman Act because “an exchange of price information and price adherence
compelled by a state” has “never [been] held” to “necessarily constitute[ ]
a violation of the antitrust laws in all cases.”164 The Second Circuit argued that even if the state regulation caused “‘conscious parallelism[,]’
i.e., identical or nearly identical pricing,” additional “plus factors” would
be required to indicate an agreement among competitors.165 Ultimately,
the court decided that because “New York wholesalers can fulfill all of
their obligations under the statute without . . . conspiring to fix prices,”
the statute did not violate federal antitrust laws and was not subject to
preemption.166
Because the court found that the statute was not in conflict with the
Sherman Act, evaluation of the applicability of the state action immunity
doctrine was not necessary; however, the court addressed it in dicta.167
The court sought to distinguish the New York statute from the one in
Midcal by saying the California regulatory scheme “sought to achieve a
system of minimum resale prices,” and thus it was “appropriate to require
active state involvement in price setting as a condition to immunity,”
whereas the New York restraint of trade “sought only to produce orderly
market conditions.”168 Judge Friendly asserted that “[u]nder such a program there is nothing that the state can ‘actively supervise’ except to see
that the statutory requirements are obeyed—and there [was] no claim
that the state ha[d] neglected this.”169
The objectives of both statutes serve to artificially impact the market,
and therefore it does not matter that the New York regulatory scheme
only “stabilized” the market rather than setting minimum prices,170 because removing any pricing uncertainties disincentivizes competitors from
providing lower prices to consumers and can result in just as much harm
163. Id.
164. Id. at 174.
165. Id. at 175 (first citing Interstate Cir., Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); and
then citing United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966)). But see, e.g., Theatre
Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954); Levitch v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 649, 674–75 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 697 F.2d 495 (2d Cir.
1983). Such factors may include: whether an industry was “dominated by relatively few
sellers”; that “[t]he product is fungible and the competition for sales is price”; and that
“[t]he demand is inelastic, as buyers place orders only for immediate, short term needs.”
Battipaglia, 745 F.2d at 175 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Container
Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969)). As mentioned earlier in this Comment, one
could convincingly argue that some of those factors are present in the liquor or beer and
wine industry.
166. Battipaglia, 745 F.2d at 175 (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 176–77.
168. Id. at 176.
169. Id.
170. Contra id.
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to consumers caused by a minimum price-setting scheme. The Supreme
Court has emphasized that the purpose of the active supervision requirement in the Midcal test is “to determine whether the State has exercised
sufficient independent judgment and control so that the details of the
rates or prices have been established as a product of deliberate state intervention, not simply by agreement among private parties.”171 The Second Circuit’s assertion that there is “nothing that the state can ‘actively
supervise’” in a market stabilizing regulatory scheme172 is misguided, as
shown by the opinions of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits emphasizing the
importance of state review of post-and-hold prices for reasonableness.173
Despite its discussion around the state action immunity doctrine, the Battipaglia court said, “[R]eliance on Parker v. Brown is unnecessary in this
case,” and “we think it best to . . . leave the issue for another day.”174
In dissent, Judge Winter criticized the Battipaglia majority opinion’s focus on the “post” part of the New York statute and the failure to place
equal attention on the “hold” requirement, pointing out that “[a] requirement of adherence to announced prices has been uniformly held illegal
without regard to its reasonableness.”175 As a result of the per se illegality of such a provision, the dissent argued that Midcal’s two-pronged assessment for state action immunity would in fact apply.176 Judge Winter
asserted that the “majority’s concern that the arrangement here [was]
compelled by law rather than achieved through private arrangement” was
relevant only to the first part of the Midcal test—”whether the challenged
restraint is ‘clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy’”177—but “the fact that the state compels a private cartel offers no
reason to exempt the legislation from scrutiny under the [S]upremacy
[C]lause.”178
Moving to the second prong, Judge Winter found that the New York
statute failed to meet the “active supervision” requirement: “[T]he only
‘monitoring’ of the state program lies in the provision that responsive
price changes cannot be lower than those announced by competitors. . . .
which heightens rather than monitors the anti-competitive impact of the
legislation . . . .”179 Both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits and leading antitrust experts, have found the Battipaglia dissent’s argument to be more
171. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 634–35 (1992).
172. Battipaglia, 745 F.2d at 176.
173. See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 894–95 (9th Cir. 2008);
TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 208–09 (4th Cir. 2001).
174. Battipaglia, 745 F.2d at 177.
175. Id. at 179 (Winter, J., dissenting) (first citing Sugar Inst. v. United States, 297 U.S.
553, 601 (1936); then citing Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 649–50 (1980)
(per curiam); and then citing United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290
(1897)).
176. Id.
177. Id. (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.
97, 105 (1980)).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 180 (emphasis added).
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compelling.180
Despite this, in 2019, the Second Circuit applied the majority approach
from Battipaglia—which was decided prior to the Supreme Court’s Fisher
opinion—to Connecticut’s post-and-hold regulatory provision.181 The
Second Circuit overlooked Fisher’s focus on hybrid versus unilateral restraints and instead focused on the Supreme Court’s use of the term
“concerted action.”182 The Second Circuit admitted that the restraint was
hybrid under a Fisher analysis, but found that it did not “mandate[ ] or
authorize[ ] ‘concerted action’ among the wholesalers subject to it” and
therefore could not be the type of “concerted action” that § 1 of the Sherman Act seeks to prohibit.183 Despite conceding that the post-and-hold
provision was hybrid, the court quoted Fisher, making a note that “[a]
restraint imposed unilaterally by government does not become concertedaction within the meaning of the statute simply because it has a coercive
effect upon parties who must obey the law.”184
The Second Circuit’s decision is puzzling considering that in an earlier
decision, it had found that “since [its] decision in Battipaglia, the Supreme
Court [had] made it clear that an actual ‘contract, combination[,] or conspiracy’ need not be shown for a state statute to be preempted by the
Sherman Act.”185 In rejecting the observation from its previous opinion,
the Second Circuit distinguished the cited Supreme Court case by claiming that because the conduct in that case was vertical and the wholesalers
and retailers “were in privity . . . . [t]hey entered . . . agreements against
the backdrop (and presumably with the knowledge) of the price-fixing
term that state law would supply,” and therefore the collusion requirement of § 1 was met.186 The Second Circuit further asserted that “Connecticut’s prohibition on altering prices for a 30-day period is a purely
negative restraint. It does not call for any private action, let alone concerted action.”187
Citing Fisher’s mention of concerted action, the Second Circuit concluded that “Judge Friendly was right both to focus on the posting, rather
than the holding, component of New York’s post-and-hold law, and to
180. See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 893–96 (9th Cir. 2008);
TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 210 (4th Cir. 2001); 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION ¶ 217, at 308–09 (2d ed. 2000) (“Given the great danger that agreements to
post and adhere will facilitate horizontal collusion, the dissent’s position [in Battipaglia] is
more consistent with [Supreme Court precedent].”).
181. Conn. Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC v. Seagull, 932 F.3d 22, 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2019).
182. See id. at 37–38 (quoting Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 267 (1986)).
183. Id. at 38 (“The mere fact that all competing owners must comply with the same
provisions of the Ordinance is not enough to establish a conspiracy among landlords.”
(quoting Fisher, 475 U.S. at 267)).
184. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Fisher, 475 U.S. at 267).
185. Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 223 n.17 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis
added) (quoting 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 345–46 n.8 (1987)).
186. Conn. Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC, 932 F.3d at 37.
187. Id. at 38 (first citing Hertz Corp. v. City of New York, 1 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir.
1993); and then citing Flying J, Inc. v. Van Hollen, 621 F.3d 658, 662–63 (7th Cir. 2010)).
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find the law non-preempted.”188 Although Fisher and its progeny have
created confusion around the interplay between per se illegality and state
supervision requirements, the Second Circuit’s disjointed assessment and
its overlook of Midcal have further muddied the waters. The court held
that “[t]he gravamen of § 1 is an agreement among competitors,”189 and
quoted another Second Circuit case to say that “parallel behavior that
does not result from an agreement is not unlawful even if it is
anticompetitive.”190
Deviating from its sibling circuits, the Second Circuit found that the
post-and-hold provision “facilitates . . . conduct that parties c[ould] legally undertake on their own under § 1” of the Sherman Act.191 It
claimed that because “there [was] a ‘natural’ explanation . . . for the[ ]
competitors to arrive at common monthly product prices” due to common economic interests, there was not an agreement among them.192 The
court declined to consider a key point: that the interdependent interest
created by the post-and-hold scheme is exactly what obviates the need for
an explicit agreement because the state regulation fills that role. The
court acknowledged that “the law itself invites and facilities conscious
parallelism in pricing” but claimed that such lockstep conduct does not
constitute concerted action simply because “[n]othing about th[e] arrangement requires, anticipates, or incents communication or collaboration among the competing wholesalers.”193 To argue that one could not
anticipate that a post-and-hold provision would result in supracompetitive, nearly identical prices across the wholesaler landscape is to ignore
basic economic incentives. To argue that a post-and-hold provision does
not incent competitors to avoid price wars that would lead to lower prices
is to ignore the explicitly stated purpose of such provisions: to keep prices
high in order to discourage alcohol consumption.
C. CLARIFICATION IS NEEDED: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
UNILATERAL/HYBRID DISTINCTION, ACTIVE GOVERNMENT
SUPERVISION, AND THE AGREEMENT
REQUIREMENT OF SECTION ONE
Unsatisfied with the Second Circuit’s selective assessment of Connecticut’s post-and-hold pricing scheme, a judge requested a poll on whether
to rehear the case en banc.194 Though the poll did not receive the required majority for a rehearing, four judges composed a scathing dissent
criticizing the majority’s failure to take the opportunity to “join federal
courts across the country in rejecting Battipaglia’s majority opinion” and
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 315 (2d Cir. 2015)).
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Conn. Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC v. Seagull, 936 F.3d 119, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2019).
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correctly follow Supreme Court precedent.195 Judge Sullivan’s dissent
highlighted the harsh result of the refusal to rehear the case: in so doing,
“[W]e perpetuate a longstanding circuit split and continue to allow de
facto state-sanctioned cartels of alcohol wholesalers to impose artificially
high prices on consumers and retailers across all three states in our Circuit.”196 The dissent began its discussion with the striking observation
that “the correct legal analysis has been staring us in the face for more
than thirty-five years.”197
The dissent identified the Second Circuit majority’s primary misstep:
“[I]t cites Fisher for the proposition that preemption is not warranted
unless the statute in question authorizes or compels actual ‘concerted action’ among private parties. But again, Fisher requires no such thing.”198
Judge Sullivan highlighted the majority’s preoccupation with finding an
unequivocal agreement between competitors, which in turn caused a disregard for the Supreme Court’s decision in Midcal: “Simply ending the
analysis because of the lack of concerted activity among the wholesalers
fails to take into account the presence and effect of the state’s involvement in the matter.”199
Given the “unusual circumstances of this case, which turns on a 1984
split decision that has been undermined by intervening Supreme Court
case law and roundly rejected by courts and commentators alike,”200 it
was surprising when the Supreme Court declined to consider Total Wine’s
challenge to Connecticut’s post-and-hold pricing scheme in early 2020.201
Scholars and judges alike have bemoaned the confusion caused by the
terminology courts have used to develop the state action doctrine.202 Justice Rehnquist went so far as to say, “I think it quite clear that questions
involving the so-called ‘state action’ doctrine are more properly framed
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 120–21 (“In the years following our decision in Battipaglia, courts outside
our Circuit have—without exception—rejected Judge Friendly’s position and instead followed Judge Winter’s dissent in striking down similar post-and-hold laws.” (first citing
Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 893-96, 893 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008); then
citing TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 209–10 (4th Cir. 2001); then citing Canterbury
Liquors & Pantry v. Sullivan, 16 F. Supp. 2d 41, 47 (D. Mass. 1998); then citing Miller v.
Hedlund, 813 F.2d 1344, 1348–51 (9th Cir. 1987); and then citing Beer & Pop Warehouse v.
Jones, 41 F. Supp. 2d 552, 560–62 (M.D. Pa. 1999))). But see id. at 123 n.1 (“[T]wo state
supreme courts ruled that their states’ post-and-hold laws were unilateral restraints not
subject to preemption under the Sherman Act.” (first citing Intercontinental Packaging Co.
v. Novak, 348 N.W.2d 330, 337–38 (Minn. 1984); and then citing Wine & Spirits Specialty,
Inc. v. Daniel, 666 S.W.2d 416, 418–19 (Mo. 1984))).
198. Id. at 122 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (citing Conn. Fine Wine & Spirits,
LLC v. Seagull, 932 F.3d 22, 38 (2d Cir. 2019)) (“[A] hybrid restraint may be attacked
under Fisher even when ‘there is no “contract, combination . . ., or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade.”’ (quoting 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 345 n.8 (1987))).
199. Id. (quoting Hedlund, 813 F.2d at 1349).
200. Id. at 124.
201. See Conn. Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC v. Seagull, 140 S. Ct. 2641, 2641 (2020).
202. See Lopatka & Page, supra note 95, at 270 n.3.
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as being ones of pre-emption rather than exemption.”203 The Supreme
Court should have taken the opportunity to clarify the requirements of
state liquor regulatory programs in light of federal antitrust laws. Specifically, the case would have been an ideal opportunity to elucidate the relationship between the unilateral versus hybrid distinction, the requirement
for active state supervision, and the per se violation requirement for antitrust preemption.
IV. POST-AND-HOLD LAWS ARE NECESSARILY COLLUSIVE
AND ARE A COSTLY WAY TO PROMOTE
CONSUMER WELFARE
A. THE ANTICOMPETITIVE COLLUSION FACILITATED BY POST-ANDHOLD SCHEMES IS SUFFICIENT TO MEET THE CONCERTED
ACTION REQUIREMENT OF SECTION ONE
The Supreme Court has previously recognized that “the federal antitrust laws pre-empt state laws authorizing or compelling private parties to
engage in anticompetitive behavior,”204 and in doing so rejected the
“contention that there is no ‘contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade’” underlying the behavior.205 The Second Circuit’s requirement of an explicit agreement in order to satisfy the collusion aspect
of the Sherman Act is misguided because the primary purpose of a state
regulatory scheme is to compel a particular behavior from market participants, which in the case of post-and-hold provisions, forces what—in
practice—amounts to cartel-like behavior that could otherwise be accomplished only through express agreement. It is precisely the government’s
scheme that allows collusion to appear tacit rather than explicit. The Second Circuit’s interpretation of the Midcal and Fisher tests means that it
would likely never find the requisite explicit collusion in a state regulatory
scheme because the state could claim that there was no “meeting of the
minds.” The Supreme Court has expressly rejected that stance, saying “a
state [can]not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by
authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is
lawful.”206
The post-and-hold scheme is “a repeated game, played by the same
participants month after month,” in which the supposed regulator makes
cartel prices possible.207 The players are aware of this; the game is rigged
in their favor, and there is no incentive for the oligopolists to compete on
price. In schemes where rivals are able to revise their prices after seeing
their competitors’ prices, there is no incentive to do so: “Cutting prices in
203. Id. (quoting Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 62 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
204. 324 Liquor Corp., 479 U.S. at 345 n.8 (emphasis added) (citing N. Securities Co. v.
United States, 193 U.S. 197, 345–46 (1904) (plurality opinion)).
205. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1).
206. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (citing N. Securities Co., 193 U.S. at 332,
344–47).
207. Conlon & Rao, supra note 45, at 11.

868

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

the first stage merely reduces the size of the profits without any change to
the division” of the profits.208 Empirical studies have found that rivals
very rarely update their prices in the second stage because the players
have already figured out how to exploit the regulatory scheme.209 Such
consistent economic patterns are evidence of tacit collusion in the
marketplace.
Another phenomenon goes to show there is an understanding amongst
competitors: in markets free of collusion, an increase in the number of
firms who sell a particular product usually leads to a decrease in price.210
In a post-and-hold market, however, “unless the entrant has a lower opportunity cost of selling than any firm in the existing market, prices would
not decline, and . . . the division of surplus . . . [would] be reduced for the
incumbents to accommodate the entrant.”211 Under such a scheme, the
introduction of additional competitors may “counterintuitively lead to
higher prices.”212 The economic patterns are sufficient to infer an illegal
agreement among the competitors: “If a firm raises price in the expectation that its competitors will do likewise, and they do, the firm’s behavior
can be conceptualized as the offer of a unilateral contract that the offerees accept by raising their prices.”213
Scholars who have argued against holding anticompetitive tacit agreements as unlawful have often based their reasoning on the difficulty of
crafting a “sensible and appropriate remedy” to address the oligopolists’
engagement in the collusion.214 The arguments that a remedy would be
“hopelessly vague” or “demand ‘irrational behavior’” are unpersuasive,
however, in situations where the tacit collusion is caused by a government
regulatory scheme.215 The remedy is straightforward: enjoin the state provision causing the anticompetitive collusive behavior.216
Judge Posner has argued that “[t]acit collusion is not an unconscious
state,” and therefore appropriate remedies would not attempt to force
“oligopolists to behave irrationally.”217 Even scholars that would not
208. Id. at 10, 13 (“The competitive equilibrium under [post-and-hold] results in prices
at least as high as the lowest-opportunity-cost single-product monopolist would have set,
even though firms play a single period non-cooperative game, in which several firms distribute identical products.”); see also Lopatka & Page, supra note 95, at 300 n.157 (arguing
“if a state allowed a single competitor to choose a price, and ordered all other competitors
to charge the price selected, the regulation would amount to authorization of an explicit
price fixing arrangement,” which, in practice, is what the post-and-hold endorses).
209. See, e.g., Conlon & Rao, supra note 45, at 13, 15 (“[L]ess than 1% of prices are
amended in the second stage.”).
210. Id. at 13.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 14.
213. Lopatka & Page, supra note 95, at 302 (quoting In re High Fructose Corn Syrup
Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2002)).
214. See id. at 304 (citing Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the
Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 669–70
(1962)).
215. See id. at 304–05, 308–09.
216. See id. at 312.
217. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, 97–98 (2d ed. 2001).
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readily hold tacit collusion (such as interdependent pricing) as unlawful
are “willing to condemn cases of oligopolistic interdependence supported
by facilitating practices”—such as the government’s facilitation of competitors’ fixed prices through post-and-hold schemes—because they “can
envision a sensible injunction against such practices.”218 Of course, if the
competitors continued to fix prices after the preemption of the state regulatory scheme, “then the relevant restraint would be the subsequent
agreement, a wholly private restraint, and . . . the actors would be liable
for violating [§] 1.”219
B. POST-AND-HOLD PROVISIONS ALLOW PRIVATE ACTORS
DETERMINE THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF CONSUMER
HARM PERPETUATED BY THE STATE-PROTECTED
CARTEL

TO

Particularly in post-and-hold schemes that allow competitors to revise
their prices within a set period of time after the initial posting, the government’s involvement is not sufficient to meet Midcal’s second prong for
state action immunity because the state is merely enforcing private marketing decisions rather than prescribing specific uniform behavior. In
post-and-hold schemes, “private discretion . . . is not the discretion to
engage in the facilitating practice; the statute may unambiguously compel
private actors to engage in the precise conduct that facilitates tacit collusion.”220 Rather, “private discretion inheres in the private collusion that
compliance with the statute predictably enables.”221 The resulting collusion, “not the conduct required by the statute, is the source of the anticompetitive injury.”222 In effect, the state acts as a conduit for what
would otherwise be illegal cartel behavior: disseminating specific pricing
information and allowing competitors to respond to the unveiled information which inevitably leads to fixed prices.223 The complete transparency creates a risk-free marketplace for oligopolists that they would
not otherwise enjoy in a free market, and hinders both interbrand and
intrabrand competition.
Post-and-hold regulatory schemes place “irresistible pressure on . . .
private part[ies] to” fix monopolistic, artificially high prices in concert
with one another and therefore must be condemned under § 1 of the
Sherman Act.224 As Justice Stevens has stated, “[e]ven though the State
presumably could regulate the . . . market by fixing . . . prices itself, it
218. See, e.g., Lopatka & Page, supra note 95, at 304–06.
219. Id. at 312.
220. Id. at 301–02.
221. Id. at 302.
222. Id.
223. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 238
(1993) (“Tacit coordination is facilitated by a stable market environment, fungible products, and a small number of variables upon which the firms seeking to coordinate their
pricing may focus.”). Post-and-hold provisions provide fertile ground for tacit collusion.
224. See Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 661 (1982).
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could not empower private parties to undertake such regulation.”225 Postand-hold schemes allow the individual actors to collectively “determine
the nature and extent of the resulting consumer injury”—a right that
must remain with the state government in order for the regulation to
avoid antitrust violation and thus preemption.226 Post-and-hold schemes
create a state-enabled cartel, and the Supreme Court has already recognized that a state law that facilitates cartelization is grounds for
invalidation.227
C. THERE ARE ALTERNATIVES TO POST-AND-HOLD PROVISIONS
THAT MORE EFFECTIVELY PROMOTE TEMPERANCE WHILE
AVOIDING THE PROVOCATION OF
ANTICOMPETITIVE INJURIOUS CONDUCT
Both courts and scholars have acknowledged that there are likely better ways to promote the goals that post-and-hold provisions purport to
encourage without “run[ning] afoul” of antitrust law, such as the adoption of higher excise taxes.228 There is widespread agreement that lower
societal consumption of alcohol leads to important benefits such as lower
rates of vehicular accident fatalities, a healthier population, and reduced
crime;229 however, a recent study found that post-and-hold regulations
are a “costly way to reduce [the] consumption [of alcohol]” because they
“also distort[ ] relative prices and thus product choices.”230 For example,
through the post-and-hold system, “[b]ecause market power leads firms
to price to inverse elasticities, relative markups are higher on higher-quality premium products, and consumers distort their purchase decisions
downwards on the quality ladder.”231 Because the state-created cartel
sets prices based on “consumer[s’] willingness to pay,” free from the normal requirement to compete on price, the monopolist sets perceived
“high-end” products at the highest price without regard to alcohol content.232 Replacing post-and-hold provisions with alternative means of
promoting temperance that focus on the ethanol content of the products,
rather than just the willingness of consumers to pay for a perceived no225. Id. at 667 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
226. Lopatka & Page, supra note 95, at 273.
227. See 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 342–43 (1987).
228. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 885 (9th Cir. 2008); Conlon &
Rao, supra note 45, at 3.
229. E.g., Conlon & Rao, supra note 45, at 8.
230. Id. at 3.
231. Id. at 35.
232. See id. at 14–15. The study provided the following example:
Dubra Vodka and Grey Goose Vodka . . . contain identical amounts of pure
ethanol. Dubra does not spend any money on advertising and is available
only in plastic bottles, and Grey Goose spends almost $15 million on advertising each year. While Grey Goose frequently sells for over $29.99 per bottle, Dubra sells for $7.99. Concerned about only the externality, the social
planner would set similar price-cost margins for both goods. Concerned with
profits, the monopolist might be inclined to set a relatively low margin on the
more elastically-demanded Dubra, and a higher margin on the more inelastically demanded Grey Goose. . . .
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tion of luxury, would more effectively achieve the benefits derived from
lower consumption. Additionally, although post-and-hold provisions
have, in some cases, been found to successfully reduce consumption, replacing the anticompetitive provisions with a tax would promote temperance while also serving the additional purpose of raising revenue for the
state government.233
Lower alcohol consumption in the abstract should not necessarily be
the end goal of regulatory schemes; rather, the benefits derived from
lower consumption should be the focus of any protectionist attempts to
temper consumption. Post-and-hold provisions have been associated with
lower levels of consumption, but studies have found “no statistically measurable relationship between [post-and-hold] laws and either drunk driving accidents or underage drinking.”234
Another oft-cited goal of post-and-hold schemes—the protection of
small retail businesses—is met in some regards but fails in other important ways. States with post-and-hold provisions have been found to have
a larger share of small retailers, but also “lower employment in the liquor
retail sector[ ] and fewer retail stores per capita.”235 Further, “[w]hile
under [post-and-hold laws,] small retailers enjoy uniform pricing, they
also pay the higher prices that result from non-competitive wholesaler
pricing behavior.”236 These higher prices are then passed on to the consumer. In Connecticut, for example, the state’s regulatory scheme has resulted in “retail prices for wine and spirits . . . that are as much as 24%
higher than prices offered for identical products in the surrounding
states.”237
V. CONCLUSION
Courts, scholars, and participants at all levels in the alcohol distribution
chain lack clarity about the legality of post-and-hold provisions. More
alarmingly, there is considerable confusion about key elements in the Supreme Court’s antitrust and preemption jurisprudence regarding the extent to which an explicit agreement is needed for preemption based on
By undoing the distortion the monopolist creates in relative prices, we would
expect to lower the price of the most inelastically-demanded goods.
Id. (emphasis added). Essentially, by replacing the post-and-hold provision with an excise
tax, consumers would be able to pay lower prices for higher quality products. See id. This is
one conception of an improvement in consumer welfare through the riddance of post-andhold provisions.
233. See id. at 8; Cooper & Wright, supra note 32, at 382 n.35 (noting “the Supreme
Court has stated in dicta that raising revenues” was a valid state interest under the Twentyfirst Amendment).
234. See, e.g., Cooper & Wright, supra note 32, at 391 (“If states wish to reduce the
social ills associated with drinking, our results—which are consistent with others—suggest
that increasing taxes and enacting laws directly targeting social harms are superior policy
instruments to [post-and-hold] laws.”).
235. Conlon & Rao, supra note 45, at 20.
236. Id. at 19.
237. Conn. Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC v. Seagull, 932 F.3d 22, 28 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing
Complaint ¶ 18, supra note 153).
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§ 1 of the Sherman Act, the interplay between Fisher’s distinction of unilateral versus hybrid restraints and Midcal’s two-pronged state immunity
doctrine, and the order of operations for the application of all these analyses. The complexity and disarray in this area have not only led to different processes—shown by the Ninth and Fourth Circuits’ divergent
approaches in applying Supreme Court precedent to post-and-hold provisions—but have also led to disparate results shown by the Second Circuit’s decision to reapply Battipaglia’s holding even in light of newer
Supreme Court guidance. Post-and-hold provisions should not be permitted to continue to cast a “gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is
essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.”238
Though the involvement of alcohol in post-and-hold regulations requires unique consideration under the Twenty-first Amendment, the Supreme Court’s clarification of the law in the area of preemption by
antitrust laws would have broader implications for other state fair trade
and regulatory practices. The lack of clarity surrounding state action analysis could lead to troubling circumstances in which private parties—engaging in a state-imposed hybrid restraint ultimately found to violate
federal antitrust laws and to fail immunity tests—are then exposed to liability for treble damages.239 Without Supreme Court resolution, “private
parties who restrain trade pursuant to government directives do so at
their peril.”240

238. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106
(1980); see also N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 505–06 (2015)
(“[P]rohibitions against anticompetitive self-regulation by active market participants are
an axiom of federal antitrust policy.” (citing Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 584 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The risk that private regulation of . . . prices . . . may be designed
to confer monopoly profits on members of an industry at the expense of the consuming
public has been the central concern of . . . our antitrust jurisprudence.”)).
239. Lopatka & Page, supra note 95, at 292.
240. Id.

